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Defensive Patent Litigation Strategy for 
Chinese Companies: A Review of the 
Extraterritorial Reach of the United 
States Patent Laws 
Lisa D. Zang* 
 
China has experienced an extraordinary transformation from a 
poor, developing nation into a global economic power. With China 
becoming one of the U.S.’s largest trading partners, however,  
Chinese companies have become increasingly enmeshed in U.S.  
patent litigations. Although the U.S. patent laws are intended only 
to govern conduct within the nation’s borders, the line between do-
mestic and foreign economic activities has become increasingly 
blurred. Modern sales transactions often span multiple countries, 
and in such situations, it may not be clear whether the U.S. patent 
laws apply. For Chinese companies facing exposure to U.S. patent 
litigations, it is critical to understand what qualifies as an infringing 
“sale” and “offer to sell” within the U.S. for purposes of determin-
ing patent infringement liability and damages. It is also important 
to understand the circumstances under which a foreign company 
may be liable for patent infringement in the U.S. if products that are  
manufactured and sold overseas independently make their way into 
the U.S. This Article addresses the foregoing issues against the 
backdrop of the extraterritorial reach and limitations of the U.S.  
patent laws. 
 
* Lisa D. Zang is an Intellectual Property Litigation Senior Associate at Wilson Sonsini 
Goodrich & Rosati, P.C. in Los Angeles, California. She holds a J.D. from the University 
of California Los Angeles School of Law and a B.S. in Biology and B.S. in Business 
Economics and Management from the California Institute of Technology. This article 
presents only the author’s then-present views, which should not be attributed to the firm or 
to any of its clients. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the span of forty years, China has experienced an extraordi-
nary transformation from a poor, developing nation into a global 
economic power. Since the initiation of free market economic re-
forms and trade liberalization in 1979, China has achieved real GDP 
growth of close to 10% annually—a rate described by the World 
Bank as “the fastest sustained expansion by a major economy in his-
tory.”1 In the wake of this unprecedented growth, China has become 
the U.S.’s largest merchandise trading partner, largest source of im-
ports, and third largest export market.2 
But success begets attention. With the amount of business that 
Chinese companies do with the U.S., Chinese companies and those 
 
1 WAYNE M. MORRISON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL33534, CHINA’S ECONOMIC RISE: 
HISTORY, TRENDS, CHALLENGES, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 1 (2019).  
2 Id. 
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that do business with them have become increasingly enmeshed in 
U.S. patent litigations.3 Some Chinese litigants may ask: how can 
this be, when the U.S. patent laws are only intended to govern con-
duct within the nation’s borders and not that which lies beyond? The 
reality is that the line between domestic and foreign economic ac-
tivities has become increasingly blurred in recent years, with mod-
ern marketing, design, manufacturing, and sales transactions each 
spanning multiple countries. Consider a situation where the substan-
tial activities of a sales transaction, such as the execution of an 
agreement for processors manufactured in China and sold within 
Asia, take place in the U.S. Alternatively, consider a situation where 
chips manufactured in China and sold to customers within Asia are 
incorporated into smartphones that independently make their way to 
the U.S., where the nation’s patent laws apply with full force. In 
such situations, it may not be clear whether the U.S. patent laws ap-
ply to the transactions at issue. 
For Chinese companies facing exposure to U.S. patent litiga-
tions, there are three important questions to answer. First, what qual-
ifies as an infringing “sale” within the U.S. for purposes of deter-
mining patent infringement liability and damages? Second, what 
qualifies as an infringing “offer to sell” within the U.S. for purposes 
of making those same determinations? Third, under what circum-
stances can a foreign company be liable for patent infringement in 
the U.S. where products manufactured and sold overseas inde-
pendently make their way to the U.S.? 
This Article addresses the foregoing questions against the back-
drop of the extraterritorial reach and limitations of the U.S. patent 
laws. In Part II, this Article reviews what qualifies as an infringing 
“sale” within the U.S. Additionally, Part II evaluates recent cases 
where foreign defendants successfully argued that their overseas ac-
tivities did not qualify as sales within the U.S., as well as cases 
where foreign defendants were unsuccessful in making similar ar-
guments. Part II also identifies defensive patent litigation strategies 
for Chinese companies in view of the legal framework and case stud-
ies. In Part III, this Article performs the same analysis for “offers to 
 
3 Cindy Yang et al., Panel 1: Issues in the U.S. for Chinese Businesses, 24 CARDOZO J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 457, 466 (2016). 
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sell” within the U.S. In Part IV, this Article conducts the same anal-
ysis for induced infringement of U.S. patents. In Part V, this Article 
concludes with observations regarding U.S. patent litigation strate-
gies for Chinese companies moving forward. 
 
I. “SALES” WITHIN THE UNITED STATES  
A. Legal Framework 
The general rule under U.S. patent law is that no infringement 
occurs when an accused product is made and sold in another coun-
try.4 As Justice White wrote in 1972, “[o]ur patent system makes  
no claim to extraterritorial effect; ‘these acts of Congress do not,  
and were not intended to, operate beyond the limits of the United 
States.’”5 Thus, the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit have made 
clear that the U.S. patent laws, like other laws, must be understood 
in view of a deep-rooted presumption against extraterritorial reach.6 
Any doubt as to whether an act falls within the reach of the U.S. 
patent laws should be resolved in favor of the presumption against 
extraterritoriality7 (i.e., in favor of a finding that the act does not 
infringe). This presumption applies not only to identifying what  
conduct qualifies as infringing for liability purposes, but also to  
determining the amount of damages that may be imposed for such 
conduct.8 
The general infringement provision of the U.S. Patent Act, 35 
U.S.C. § 271(a) (“Section 271(a)”), addresses most infringements 
that occur “within the United States.”9 Section 271(a) states as  
follows: 
“Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without au-
thority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, 
 
4 Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 441 (2007). 
5 Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531 (1972) (citing Brown v. 
Duchesne, 60 U.S. 183, 195 (1856)). 
6 Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Grp., Ltd., 807 F.3d 1283, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 
2015) (citing Microsoft, 550 U.S. at 454; Deepsouth Packing, 406 U.S. at 531). 
7 Microsoft, 550 U.S. at 454. 
8 Carnegie Mellon, 807 F.3d at 1306 (citing Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild 
Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., 711 F.3d 1348, 1371–72 (Fed. Cir. 2013)). 
9 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). 
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within the United States or imports into the United States any pa-
tented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the 
patent.”10 
Thus, it is an act of infringement under Section 271(a) to make, 
use, sell, or offer to sell a patented invention within the U.S. or im-
port a patented invention into the U.S.11 
To determine whether a “sale” has occurred within the U.S., 
courts consider whether the defendant’s activities in the U.S. are 
sufficient to qualify as a “sale” under Section 271(a) given the strong 
policy against extraterritorial liability.12 Determining where a sale 
has occurred, however, may be neither simple nor straightforward. 
As the Federal Circuit put it, “[t]he standards for determining where 
a sale may be said to occur do not pinpoint a single, universally  
applicable fact that determines the answer, and it is not even settled 
whether a sale can have more than one location.”13 This is particu-
larly true in today’s age, where supply chains and sales cycles often 
span multiple countries and domestic activity can have foreign  
effects while foreign activity can likewise have domestic effects. 
Nonetheless, courts have held that places relevant to determin-
ing where a sale has occurred include: the place where tangible prop-
erty is transferred or delivered; the place where a contract for the 
transfer or delivery of tangible property is executed; the place where 
performance actually occurs or is expected to occur under a contract; 
the place where specific orders of products are negotiated and final-
ized; and the place where other substantial activities of a sales trans-
action occur.14 When all such “substantial activities” of a sales trans-
action take place outside the U.S., less “substantial” activities, such 
as pricing and contract negotiations, in the U.S. are, on their own, 





12 Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 769 F.3d 1371, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2014), vacated 
on other grounds, Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016). 
13 Carnegie Mellon, 807 F.3d at 1308. 
14 Id. at 1308–09; Halo Elecs., 769 F.3d at 1379; Transocean Offshore Deepwater 
Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., 617 F.3d 1296, 1310–11 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
15 Halo Elecs., 769 F.3d at 1379. 
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B. Case Studies 
This Article first analyzes summary judgment cases. A “sum-
mary judgment” is a judgment that is summarily entered by a court 
for one party and against another party.16 In other words, the judg-
ment is entered without a trial.17 As a result, a successful summary 
judgment motion may significantly reduce overall legal expendi-
tures for a case by disposing of all or a subset of the claims before 
trial.18 
A court may grant summary judgment if it decides that the  
moving party is entitled to prevail under the existing law and there 
are no material (i.e., major) factual issues.19 If summary judgment  
is denied, the remaining claims in the case proceed to trial for deter-
mination by a judge or jury.20 Thus, a non-movant that prevails at 
the summary judgment stage may nevertheless lose on the same 
claims at trial.21 
1. Lake Cherokee v. Marvell 
In Lake Cherokee Hard Drive Technologies, L.L.C. v. Marvell 
Semiconductor, Inc., the defendant, Marvell Semiconductor, Inc. 
(“Marvell”), obtained partial summary judgment that 77% of the 
sales of its chips did not occur within the U.S.22 As a result, Marvell 
was not liable for these foreign chip sales and they were excluded 
from presentation to the jury at trial.23 
The issue in this case was whether Marvell’s domestic activities 
qualified as sales under Section 271(a).24 Marvell was a California-
 
16 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–52 (1986); HON. VIRGINIA A. 
PHILLIPS & HON. KAREN L. STEVENSON, RUTTER GRP. PRAC. GUIDE: FED. CIV. PROC. 
BEFORE TRIAL § 14-A (9th ed. 2020). 
17 PHILLIPS & STEVENSON, supra note 16.  
18 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247–52 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 
(1986)). 
19 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Edward Brunet, Markman Hearings, Summary Judgment, and 
Judicial Discretion, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 93, 98–99 (2005). 
20 PHILLIPS & STEVENSON, supra note 16.  
21 Id.  
22 Lake Cherokee Hard Drive Techs., L.L.C. v. Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 964 F. 
Supp. 2d 653, 658 (E.D. Tex. 2013). 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 657. 
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based chip supplier with no offices outside the U.S.25 Marvell con-
ducted certain sales-related activities within the U.S., including pre-
paring and submitting written proposals in response to requests for 
proposal from U.S. customers; designing chips, providing working 
samples of chips, and negotiating prices for the chips once a cus-
tomer had selected a particular Marvell proposal; achieving “design 
win[s]” with customers, which meant that the customer would pur-
chase all of the chips that it needed for a particular end product from 
Marvell; and entering into product supply agreements with these 
customers to memorialize Marvell’s agreement with the customer 
on the specification and price of the chip featured in the design 
win.26 Customers could only submit purchase orders for quantities 
of the chip if a supply agreement was in place.27 
Customers outside the U.S. submitted purchase orders for chips 
to Marvell Asia Pte Ltd. (“MAPL”), a third party Singaporean com-
pany based in Singapore.28 Following the submission of these pur-
chase orders, a third party Taiwanese company manufactured the 
chips abroad.29 Marvell International, a Bermuda company (“Mar-
vell Bermuda”), purchased the chips from the Taiwanese manufac-
turer and owned the chips until it transferred title to MAPL, which 
held title to the chips until they were delivered to the customer.30 
Revenue from these sales was placed in Singapore and Bermuda.31 
77% of these chips were not sold into the U.S. market and never 
otherwise entered the U.S.32 The remaining 23% of these chips were 
incorporated by third party customers (such as hard drive manufac-
turers and original equipment manufacturer (“OEMs”)) into prod-
ucts that were subsequently sold in the U.S.33 
The court found that sales of the 77% of chips that never entered 
the U.S. were not sales “within the United States” under Section 
 
25 Id. at 656. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 656-57. 
29 Id. at 656. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 657. 
33 Id. at 657–58. 
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271(a).34 These sales had occurred by purchase orders submitted 
outside the U.S. to third party MAPL, and the chips sold via those 
purchase orders had been manufactured abroad, delivered abroad, 
and never entered the U.S.35 The court also noted that finding other-
wise would improperly convert the act of entering into a product 
supply agreement within the U.S. into a conduit for liability every 
time a purchase order was submitted and fulfilled outside the U.S., 
even when the accused products never entered the U.S.36 Thus, the 
court granted partial summary judgment that the 77% of foreign chip 
sales did not infringe the asserted patents.37 
The court, however, determined that there was an issue of mate-
rial fact as to whether the 23% of sales of chips that were eventually 
brought into the U.S. by downstream customers were infringing 
sales under Section 271(a).38 The court denied summary judgment 
with respect to those sales.39 
For companies that make a substantial portion of their sales  
outside the U.S., eliminating foreign sales from the calculation of 
patent infringement damages is critical. By way of example,  
Chinese information and communications technology provider 
Huawei’s sales in the U.S. are only a fraction of its sales elsewhere 
in the world.40 Likewise, Sany, a Chinese multinational heavy 
equipment manufacturing company, reportedly makes most of its 
 
34 Id. at 657 (citing Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors 
USA, Inc., 617 F.3d 1296, 1307–10 (Fed. Cir. 2010)).  
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 658. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. As to the remaining 23% of sales, the jury found no direct infringement at trial. 
Verdict Form at 1, Lake Cherokee Hard Drive Techs., L.L.C. v. Marvell Semiconductor, 
Inc., 964 F. Supp. 2d 653, 658 (E.D. Tex. 2013) (No. 2:10-cv-216-JRG). 
40 Friedrich Wu et al., Dos and Don’ts for Chinese Companies Investing in the United 
States: Lessons from Huawei and Haier, 53(4) THUNDERBIRD INT’L BUS. REV. 501, 507 
(2011) (“Huawei…in 2010 alone, spent US $6.1 billion purchasing products and services 
from American companies…. In contrast, its annual sales in the United States were just US 
$400 million in the same period. This also pales in comparison to its sales in other regions. 
It is interesting to note that Huawei has managed to secure second place in the world 
telecom market without substantial business in the world’s largest market, the United 
States.”). 
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revenue in China.41 Apple also makes the majority of its total net 
sales outside the U.S.42 Lake Cherokee illustrates the value of a suc-
cessful foreign sales defense to such companies. There, 77% of the 
defendant’s sales of the accused chips were carved from the dam-
ages base and excluded from presentation to the jury at trial because 
the underlying sales activities had occurred outside the U.S.43 This 
effectively reduced the defendant’s damages exposure in that U.S.-
based patent case by 77%. 
A finding by the court that all or a substantial percentage of a 
company’s sales-related activities occurred outside the U.S. and 
therefore do not infringe can be case dispositive or, at the very least, 
highly advantageous to the company in settlement negotiations.  
Excluding foreign sales may significantly reduce the damages base, 
which is the total amount of sales of the allegedly infringing product 
during the relevant time period.44 In turn, this can significantly limit 
the size of the damages pool presented to the jury at trial. It can also 
encourage a more favorable settlement for the company, as the 
plaintiff’s ability to collect a large damages award will likely be  
severely limited by the confinement of damages to domestic sales. 
As Lake Cherokee demonstrates, a potentially case dispositive 
strategy for companies with entirely or predominantly foreign sales 
is to move for summary judgment of non-infringement with respect 
to those sales that occur abroad. As in Lake Cherokee, these motions 
are most likely to be granted where the “substantial activities” of the 
sales transactions at issue, such as the submission and acceptance of 
purchase orders, manufacturing, and delivery, take place outside the 
U.S., and the products at issue do not later enter into the U.S. 
 
41 Nin-Hai Tseng, Sany’s Bold U.S. Move, FORTUNE (June 17, 2013, 9:00 AM) 
https://fortune.com/2013/06/17/sanys-bold-u-s-move/ [https://perma.cc/UK6R-7SQD]. 
42 Apple Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 5 (Sept. 28, 2019) (“[Apple] has 
international operations with sales outside the U.S. representing a majority of the 
Company’s total net sales. In addition, a majority of [Apple’s] supply chain, and its 
manufacturing and assembly activities, are located outside the U.S.”). 
43 Lake Cherokee, 964 F. Supp. 2d at 658. 
44 KAREN VOGEL WEIL ET AL., DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY FEES, §§ 9:1.2, 9–5 (2017), 
https://legacy.pli.edu/product_files/Titles/159/%23208897_09_Patent_Litigation_P3_201
70915135404.pdf [https://perma.cc/L5TM-BWDG]. 
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2. MediaTek v. Freescale 
In MediaTek Inc. v. Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., however, the 
defendant, Freescale Semiconductor, Inc. (“Freescale”), was unsuc-
cessful in arguing that a subset of its chips did not infringe because 
they were manufactured abroad, sold to manufacturers abroad, and 
incorporated by the manufacturers into Amazon Kindle products 
abroad.45 Freescale’s motion for summary judgment of non-in-
fringement as to its foreign activities was therefore denied.46 
Freescale was a U.S. company that provided applications pro-
cessors.47 In 2009, Freescale entered into a “Freescale Standard 
Sales Agreement” (“Agreement”) with Amazon Fulfillment Ser-
vices, Inc. (“AFS”), a U.S.-based subsidiary of Amazon.com (“Am-
azon”), which is in turn a U.S. corporation.48 The negotiations lead-
ing up to the Agreement and the execution of the Agreement took 
place in the U.S.49 The Agreement governed all sales of Freescale’s 
chips to AFS and its “Authorized Purchasers” and “Designees,”50 
and stated that “Freescale will sell to Authorized Purchasers, and 
Authorized Purchasers will buy from Freescale, products from time 
to time.”51 In addition, the Agreement identified Lab126, a U.S.-
based division of Amazon, as the “Buyer” of Freescale’s products.52 
The Agreement identified prices in an attachment and stated in 
the “Prices” term that Freescale would not provide any “Designee” 
with “any rebates, discounts, free Product, kick-back or other similar 
terms related directly or indirectly to the Product supplied to any 
Designees under this Agreement without Buyer’s express, prior 
written consent.”53 The Designees could be foreign companies, such 
as Foxconn, a Taiwanese multinational electronics contract manu-
facturer.54 Moreover, subject to one exception, the Agreement 
 
45 MediaTek Inc. v. Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., No. 11-cv-5341 YGR, 2014 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 18640, at *2–3, *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2014). 




50 Id. at *4. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at *3. 
53 Id. at *4. 
54 Id. at *5, *12. 
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provided that “each time an Authorized Purchaser wishes to pur-
chase Product(s) from Freescale, the Authorized Purchaser must 
submit to Freescale a written purchase order.”55 
Freescale argued that the chips that were manufactured outside 
the U.S., sold to manufacturers outside the U.S., and incorporated 
by those manufacturers into Amazon Kindles outside the U.S., and 
thus could not qualify as infringing products because these manu-
facturing, selling, and incorporating activities occurred extraterrito-
rially.56 The court disagreed, finding that there were triable issues of 
fact from which a reasonable jury could conclude that “sales” of or 
“offers to sell” the chips had taken place in the U.S.57 In particular, 
the Agreement between Freescale and AFS specifically identified 
AFS as the “Buyer” and Freescale as the “Seller”58 and governed all 
product purchases made by AFS and its Authorized Purchasers and 
Designees from Freescale.59 As a result, although Foxconn, for ex-
ample, received the accused applications processor products in 
China for incorporation in Amazon Kindles that had also been man-
ufactured in China, Foxconn was purchasing these applications pro-
cessors pursuant to the Agreement.60 Moreover, the delegation of 
authority from AFS to the Authorized Purchasers to issue purchase 
orders to Freescale did nothing to change the fact that every sale 
arising out of those purchase orders was subject to the terms and 
conditions of the Agreement.61 In addition, AFS directly controlled 




57 Id. at *3, *12; see also id. at *7–9 (noting that cases determining whether a sale or 
offer for sale have occurred for purposes of Section 271(a) have considered factors such as 
the location of a contemplated future sale, the location of delivery, the location of 
performance, the location of the negotiation of the sales contract, and the location of the 
execution of the sales contract) (citing Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. 
Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., 617 F.3d 1296, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2010); MEMC Elec. 
Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp., 420 F.3d 1369, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005); 
Fellowes, Inc. v. Michilin Prosperity Co., Ltd., 491 F. Supp. 2d 571, 577 (E.D. Va. 2007); 
3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech Labs., Inc., 160 F.3d 1373, 1378-79 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Wing Shing 
Prods. (BVI), Ltd. v. Simatelex Mfg. Co., Ltd., 479 F. Supp. 2d 388, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)). 
58 MediaTek, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18640, at *9. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at *10. 
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Designees and had expressly restricted Freescale’s ability to directly 
negotiate with those Authorized Purchasers and Designees.62 The 
Plaintiff had also proffered evidence showing that the chips were 
paid for by U.S.-based Lab126 and that Lab126 was identified as the 
customer for the chips.63 
Based on these facts, the court concluded that the Agreement 
controlled the sales and sales terms of all purchases and provided 
tangible evidence of a sales relationship between two U.S. compa-
nies.64 As a result, the court could not find as a matter of law that 
the sales were not U.S. sales under Section 271(a) and denied Free-
scale’s motion for summary judgment.65 
In several respects, the facts of MediaTek were very similar to 
those in Lake Cherokee. In both cases, the defendants were U.S.-
based chip suppliers that had entered into supply agreements with 
their customers; the supply agreements were negotiated and exe-
cuted in the U.S.; the defendants’ customers were required to submit 
purchase orders to purchase the products at issue; and the products 
were manufactured and delivered to the customers outside the U.S. 
Why did the foreign sales argument largely succeed in Lake Chero-
kee but not in MediaTek? 
The critical difference is that the sales in MediaTek, including 
those made pursuant to the purchase orders, were governed by the 
terms and conditions of the Agreement between Freescale and AFS. 
The parties to the Agreement were two U.S. companies and it was 
U.S.-based Freescale itself that received and processed the purchase 
orders for the products at issue.66 Further, there was evidence that 
Lab126, a U.S. company based in the U.S., was the customer and 
paid for the products.67 These facts were sufficient to raise an issue 
 
62 Id. at *9 (noting that the Agreement stated that Freescale would not provide any 
“rebates, discounts, free Product, kick-back or other similar terms related directly or 
indirectly to the Product supplied to any Designees under this Agreement without Buyer’s 
express, prior written consent”). 
63 Id. at *9–10. 
64 Id. at *11–12 (distinguishing Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Eng’g, Inc., 810 F. Supp. 2d 
1173 (D. Nev. 2011) as involving only “some pricing discussions”). 
65 Id. at *12. 
66 Id. at *3, *5. 
67 Id. at *9–10. 
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of material fact about whether Freescale’s activities rose to the level 
of sales within the U.S., thereby defeating its motion for summary 
judgment of non-infringement. In contrast, in Lake Cherokee, it was 
the purchase orders submitted abroad by customers outside the U.S. 
to a third-party Singaporean company based in Singapore that gov-
erned the sales at issue. 
MediaTek and Lake Cherokee demonstrate the impact that vari-
ations in the terms and conditions of supply agreements and the 
structures of sales transactions can have on a foreign sales defense. 
Although the two cases shared a number of foundational facts, in-
cluding that the manufacturing and delivery of the products at issue 
occurred outside the U.S., they were ultimately decided very differ-
ently.68 In determining whether to implement an extraterritoriality 
defense at the summary judgment stage, companies should review 
their sales agreements, sales transactions, and business practices to 
determine whether these agreements, transactions, and practices are 
so sufficiently tied to the U.S. that they may raise material issues of 
fact about whether the company’s sales activities have occurred 
within the U.S. 
3. McGinley v. Luv N’ Care 
The two cases discussed above, Lake Cherokee and MediaTek, 
demonstrate the potential value of a foreign sales defense at the sum-
mary judgment stage of a patent infringement case. However, a for-
eign sales defense can and should be put into action even earlier in 
the case—specifically, during the initial investigation and discovery 
phases. In U.S. litigations, discovery is a pre-trial procedure that  
allows the parties to obtain evidence from each other relating to the 
claims and defenses in the case.69 If the plaintiff is unable to obtain 
documents or other information about the defendant’s foreign sales 
activities during the discovery process, the potential damages figure 
 
68 See Lake Cherokee Hard Drive Techs., L.L.C. v. Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 964 
F. Supp. 2d 653, 657–58 (granting partial summary judgment that 77% of the defendant’s 
sales of chips did not occur within the U.S.); MediaTek, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18640, at 
*2–3, *5 (denying motion for summary judgment of non-infringement as to the defendant’s 
foreign activities). 
69 The Harvard L. Rev. Ass’n, Developments in the Law — Discovery, 74 HARV. L. REV. 
942, 942 (1961). 
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will effectively be limited to the defendant’s domestic sales. As 
such, discovery can be critical in a patent litigation. The next case 
relates to discovery proceedings. 
In McGinley v. Luv N’ Care, Ltd., the court granted-in-part a 
motion to compel discovery of the defendant’s foreign sales activi-
ties.70 As a result, the defendant was ordered to provide interroga-
tory responses and produce documents concerning those activities.71 
Among other things, the Plaintiff, S.C. Products, Inc. (“SCP”), 
had sought information and documents concerning Defendant Luv 
N’ Care, Ltd.’s (“LNC”) use, sale, and offers to sell its Nuby72 Tear-
Free Rinse Pail products,73 regardless of where those sales had oc-
curred.74 In its discovery responses, LNC had objected to SCP’s 
document requests as seeking documents concerning only activity 
taking place outside of the U.S.75 LNC had also objected to provid-
ing information about its distributors, global partners, and commis-
sions, royalties, and revenues earned outside the U.S. and the sale, 
delivery, and distribution of those of its accused rinse pail products 
that were not made, used, sold, offered for sale, or imported into  
the U.S.76 
In opposing the motion to compel, LNC argued that the activities 
of third parties who operated abroad and did not manufacture, use, 
sell, or offer for sale any of the rinse pail products at issue within 
the U.S. or import these products into the U.S. was irrelevant to any 
claim or defense in the case.77 LNC asserted that it did not have any 
foreign distributors, was not involved in any transactions between 
 
70 McGinley v. Luv N’ Care, No. Civ. A. 17-0821, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 229475, at 
*1, *8–9 (W.D. La. Sept. 10, 2018) (citing Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 831 F.3d 
1369, 1377–78 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Grp., Ltd., 807 
F.3d 1283, 1306, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2015)).  
71 Id. at *12–19. 
72 LNC and Nuby are the same thing. Id. at *14. 
73 The Nuby Tear-Free Rinse Pail product is typically used for rinsing shampoo out of a 
baby’s hair while keeping water and soap out of the baby’s face and eyes. See Nuby Tear-
Free Rinse Pail, NUBY, available at https://www.nuby.com/usa/en/tear-free-rinse-pail-1-2 
[https://perma.cc/56UU-TWFD]. 
74 McGinley, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 229475, at *2. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at *7. 
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foreign manufacturers and foreign distributors, had no records of 
such transactions, did not receive any payments when purchases oc-
curred directly from Chinese factories, and did not receive royalties 
or license payments from any foreign entities.78 LNC argued that 
because the U.S. patent laws do not apply extraterritorially, these 
third-party foreign activities did not constitute infringement and 
were not relevant to the case.79 
However, LNC’s deposition testimony and that of its officers 
contradicted its claims.80 Specifically, LNC’s CEO and President 
had testified that LNC sold its products in 155 countries using dis-
tributors across the globe, had 15-20 distributors for international 
sales, had distribution agreements with international distributors, 
and received commissions from distributors under those distribution 
agreements.81 In addition, LNC’s CFO testified that international 
distributors who wanted to order a product had to use LNC’s “Luv 
N’ Care Internet Ordering System” (“LIOS”), which tracked all in-
ternational sales and had its servers located in Louisiana.82 Further, 
LNC testified that international distributors purchased its products, 
including the rinse pail products at issue in the case, directly from 
overseas factories which, until 2015, would send their profits to an 
LNC affiliate in Florida.83 Although profits from foreign sales were 
subsequently sent to a company in Hong Kong, LNC’s distributors 
in some countries would still send profits to the Florida affiliate be-
cause of governmental regulations.84 And, LNC had the ability to 
withdraw funds from the Hong Kong account and bring such funds 
to the U.S.85 Finally, LNC’s CEO testified that he negotiated with 
foreign manufacturers the cost of production for LNC’s products 
and the rate per unit that distributors paid to the factory.86 
 
78 Id. at *7, *9. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at *9. 
81 Id. at *10. 
82 Id. at *10–11. 
83 Id. at *11. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at *11–12. 
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The court found that this deposition testimony showed that LNC 
was indeed involved in many aspects of the sales between the for-
eign manufacturers and foreign distributors and, thus, that this  
activity was relevant to the claims and defenses in the case.87 While 
LNC’s activities might not ultimately infringe under the U.S. patent 
laws, the court reasoned that SCP was nevertheless entitled to dis-
cover the extent to which LNC had engaged in foreign sales activi-
ties and whether sales of the accused rinse pail products had oc-
curred within the U.S.88 
The court therefore ordered LNC to provide interrogatory re-
sponses that identified the distributors and global partners to or 
through which the accused rinse pail products were sold, delivered, 
or distributed to;89 that described the methods by which LNC re-
ceived commissions, royalties, or revenue from related transac-
tions;90 and that provided the dates, price, location, and profits for 
the production, purchase, and sale of the rinse pails.91 The court also 
ordered LNC to produce documents relating to transactions involv-
ing the accused rinse pail products.92 As the court saw it, the infor-
mation and documents were relevant because LNC’s deposition tes-
timony had indicated that it did, in fact, use and work with foreign 
distributors and was involved in various aspects of the international 
transactions, including forming distribution agreements, negotiating 
prices with factories, maintaining a product order system, and re-
ceiving commissions.93 Further, LNC had waived its objections to 
providing information about foreign sales activity in response to  
certain interrogatories by failing to raise those objections in its initial 
responses to those interrogatories and failing to address those inter-
rogatories in its opposition to the motion to compel.94 
 
87 Id. at *12. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at *15. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at *16–17. 
92 Id. at *17–18. 
93 Id. at *15–18. 
94 Id. at *16–17 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 33(b)); see Samsung Elecs. Am. Inc. v. Yang Kun 
“Michael” Chung, 325 F.R.D. 578, 591 (N.D. Tex. 2017); Henderson v. Union Pac. R.R. 
Co., No. CV 15-0669, 2016 WL 5936889, at *1 (W.D. La. Oct. 11, 2016). 
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As part of the initial investigation at the outset of a case, the 
company should conduct a review of its internal and external docu-
ments and interview its employees to determine whether, and to 
what extent, its activities are subject to the U.S. patent laws. The 
company should review its sales, marketing, accounting, and finan-
cial documents and communications to determine the viability of a 
foreign sales defense. This could include supply agreements, quota-
tions, purchase orders, shipping confirmations, invoices, sales-re-
lated emails with customers, website order forms, press releases, 
news articles, and marketing efforts at trade shows and conferences. 
The company should also interview employees who are intimately 
involved in and knowledgeable about its sales processes and any 
distinctions between its domestic and foreign sales cycles. This ini-
tial review will not only aid in preparing high-level liability and 
damages strategies, but is also key to ensuring that positions taken 
by the company during discovery on its domestic and foreign sales 
cycles are consistent. As McGinley demonstrates, conflicting testi-
mony and documents can be harmful to a foreign sales defense. 
There, it was LNC’s own deposition testimony that sank its opposi-
tion to the plaintiff’s motion to compel foreign sales discovery.95 
Once discovery begins, the pace picks up. The burden and ex-
pense of discovery in U.S. litigations can be astronomical, particu-
larly in patent litigations.96 Each party to a case may obtain discov-
ery on any non-privileged matter, so long as the discovery sought is 
relevant to the claims and/or defenses in the case and proportional 
to the needs of the case.97 Companies with significant sales and man-
ufacturing operations outside the U.S. should therefore make best 
efforts to limit discovery to their domestic activities as soon as the 
discovery phase begins. 
 
95 McGinley, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 229475, at *9–12. 
96 Randall R. Rader, The State of Patent Litigation, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 331, 336 (2012) 
(“Every person in this room understands that the greatest weakness of the U.S. court system 
is its expense. And the driving factor for that expense is discovery excesses…. Patent cases, 
in particular, produce disproportionately high discovery expenses. In one 2010 report, the 
Federal Judicial Center determined that IP cases had costs ‘almost 62% higher, all else 
equal.’”). 
97 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
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This can reduce the drain that discovery typically imposes on the 
company’s resources. It can also aid in minimizing the distractions 
on a company’s business operations that would otherwise be caused 
by litigation. For example, limiting discovery to only those products 
that are sold in the U.S. can limit the number of employees who 
could be called for deposition and therefore be required to spend 
time away from their jobs to prepare and sit for their depositions. In 
terms of the opportunity cost to the company’s business, the time 
spent by these employees on depositions can be significant. Deposi-
tion attendance can also be costly and inconvenient for witnesses 
who spend much of their time outside the U.S., such as at sales or 
manufacturing facilities in China. As another example, limiting dis-
covery to domestic activities may limit the volume of documents 
that must be collected, reviewed, and produced to only those docu-
ments concerning the company’s domestic sales. For companies that 
conduct all or a majority of their sales outside the U.S., this reduc-
tion can be significant. For Chinese companies requiring English 
translations of Chinese documents or interpreter services during the 
depositions of Chinese employees, this reduction in expenses can be 
even more significant. 
However, the plaintiff in a patent case will rarely agree that dis-
covery should be so limited. Patent defendants would therefore be 
well-served by taking an aggressive approach to confining discov-
ery to their domestic activities. For example, defendants should raise 
and preserve their objections to discovery of foreign sales activities 
early during the discovery phase of the case for resolution in a mo-
tion to compel. It is critical to affirmatively object to the discovery 
of foreign activities by expressly stating those objections in response 
to discovery requests and to expressly address these objections in 
opposing a plaintiff’s motion to compel, as a failure to do so can 
result in waiver of those objections. In McGinley, for example, the 
defendant, LNC, was deemed to have waived its objections to 
providing information about its foreign sales activities in response 
to certain interrogatories because it had failed to raise objections  
to foreign sales discovery in its initial responses and failed to 
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address the interrogatories in its opposition to the plaintiff’s motion 
to compel.98 
Proactive discovery practices, such as early and voluntary doc-
ument productions, can also be used as effective tools to advance a 
foreign sales defense. But, it is important to recognize that discovery 
is much more limited in Chinese courts than in the U.S.99 In fact, 
there is no “U.S.-style” discovery in China and, as a result, plaintiffs 
in Chinese litigations are required to collect and produce their own 
evidence to prove patent infringement and damages.100 Chinese  
defendants may not therefore be accustomed to providing confiden-
tial, proprietary, or sensitive information for U.S. litigations. 
Nevertheless, it can be advantageous for these companies to pro-
duce documents that show the distinction between their foreign and 
domestic sales transactions early on in discovery. Early document 
productions can effectively delineate between company sales that 
may be subject to the U.S. patent laws, and those that may not. Ide-
ally, this would foreclose expensive and time-consuming discovery 
geared at delineating between foreign and domestic sales, and con-
clusively show that the company’s foreign sales are irrelevant to the 
plaintiff’s U.S. patent claims. In doing so, the company may be able 
to carve out its foreign sales from the liability and damages deter-
minations at an early stage in the case. This would likely not only 
reduce discovery expenses going forward but also lay the foundation 
for an early and favorable settlement of the case. 
 
98 McGinley, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 229475, at *16–17. 
99 J. Benjamin Bai et al., What Multinational Companies Need to Know About Patent 
Invalidation and Patent Litigation in China, 5 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 449, 459 
(2007). 
100 Id. 
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II. “OFFERS TO SELL” WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 
A. Legal Framework 
An “offer to sell” under Section 271(a) is an offer that contem-
plates a sale that will take place in the U.S.101 In defining “offers to 
sell” under the statute, courts implement a traditional contract anal-
ysis.102 Under general contract principles, an offer to sell occurs 
when one party communicates a willingness to enter into a transac-
tion such that another party would understand that it has been invited 
to partake in the transaction.103 For example, a description of a pa-
tented product or service and the price at which it may be purchased 
could qualify as an offer to sell.104 
Unlike a sale, an offer to sell does not need to be accepted to 
qualify as an act of infringement.105 Further, it is the location of the 
contemplated sale, not the offer, that determines whether an offer to 
sell has occurred within the U.S. under Section 271(a).106 Therefore, 
it is not enough for an offer to be made in the U.S.;107 rather, an offer 
to sell would only qualify as infringement if the offer were to sell a 
patented invention with the sale occurring in the U.S.108 
B. Case Studies 
1. Halo v. Pulse 
In Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc., the Federal 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment of 
 
101 Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 769 F.3d 1371, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Tex. 
Advanced Optoelectronic Sols., Inc. v. Renesas Elecs. Am., Inc., 895 F.3d 1304, 1330 n.12 
(Fed. Cir. 2018). 
102 Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1254–55 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
103 Halo, 769 F.3d at 1381 (quoting MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials 
Silicon Corp., 420 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
104 Id. (quoting 3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech Labs., Inc., 160 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 
1998)). 
105 Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., 617 
F.3d 1296, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
106 Id. at 1309. 
107 Tex. Advanced Optoelectronic Sol. Inc. v. Renesas Elecs. Am. Inc., 895 F.3d 1304, 
1330 n.12 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
108 Halo, 769 F.3d at 1381 (quoting Transocean, 617 F.3d at 1309). 
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no direct infringement by the defendant’s accused products that 
were manufactured, shipped, and delivered outside the U.S.109 
The issue in Halo was whether the defendant’s activities quali-
fied as infringing sales or offers to sell within the U.S. The defend-
ant, Pulse Electronics, Inc. (“Pulse”), designed, manufactured, and 
sold the accused surface mount electronic packages in Asia, with 
manufacturing taking place exclusively in China.110 Although Pulse 
delivered some of these electronic packages to customers in the 
U.S., most of its products were delivered to customers outside the 
U.S.111 These foreign customers included contract manufacturers  
for U.S.-based companies.112 The contract manufacturers incorpo-
rated surface mount electronic package products supplied by Pulse 
into end products, such as internet routers manufactured for U.S. 
companies, which were then sold and shipped to customers world-
wide, including to customers in the U.S.113 Pulse received purchase 
orders for all products delivered abroad at its sales offices outside 
the U.S.114 
In affirming summary judgment of no direct infringement, the 
Federal Circuit held that Pulse had not sold or offered to sell within 
the U.S. the accused electronic packages that were otherwise manu-
factured, shipped, and delivered outside the U.S.115 As an initial 
matter, the products did not enter the U.S. at any point.116 Further, 
Pulse received the purchase orders for the products abroad.117 Thus, 
the Federal Circuit reasoned, the sales transactions did not qualify 
as domestic sales because the substantial activities of these transac-
tions occurred outside the U.S.118 Nor did these transactions qualify 
 
109 Id. at 1374. 
110 Id. at 1375; Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Eng’g, Inc., 810 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1207 (D. 
Nev. 2011). 




115 Id. at 1374. 
116 Id. at 1379 (citing Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Eng’g, Inc., 810 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1207 
(D. Nev. 2011). 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
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as domestic offers to sell, given that the locations of the sales con-
templated by the offers lay outside the U.S.119 
Yet, Pulse had conducted certain activities in the U.S. Specifi-
cally, Pulse had entered into a general business agreement120 with at 
least one U.S. customer, Cisco, and had engaged in quarterly pricing 
negotiations with Cisco.121 These activities did not qualify as sales 
within the U.S. because the general business agreement was not a 
contract to buy or sell any specific products and the pricing negoti-
ations did not constitute firm or binding agreements on either Pulse 
or Cisco to buy and sell any such products.122 Rather, it was the pur-
chase orders that Pulse received from Cisco’s foreign contract man-
ufacturers, including Hon-Hai Precision Co. (Foxconn), that estab-
lished the essential terms, including price and quantity, of binding 
contracts to buy and sell.123 In addition, it was Cisco’s foreign con-
tract manufacturers, and not Cisco, who paid Pulse upon fulfillment 
of these purchase orders.124 In sum, these domestic activities were 
insufficient to constitute either a sale or an offer to sell within the 
U.S. for purposes of Section 271(a).125 
In cases reaching the dispositive motion stage, foreign compa-
nies with significant sales activities outside the U.S. should move 
for summary judgment of non-infringement with respect to their for-
eign sales activities. The same applies to companies that outsource 
their manufacturing to foreign countries, such as China, and perform 
the substantial activities of their sales transactions abroad. With 
much of the world’s manufacturing taking place in China and with 
 
119 Id. at 1381. 
120 The general business agreement specified manufacturing capacity, low price 
warranty, and lead time terms, but did not refer to any specific products or prices. Id. at 
1375. 
121 Pulse additionally conducted pricing negotiations in the U.S. with American 
companies; met regularly with design engineers for American companies; sent product 
samples to American companies in the U.S.; attended sales meetings with customers in the 
U.S.; and provided post-sale support for customers in the U.S. Id. 
122 Id. at 1379. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 1375–76, 1379. 
125 Id. at 1379. 
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the rise in manufactured exports from China,126 it is not uncommon 
for companies of this variety to implement sales transactions similar 
to those in Halo. 
For Chinese companies and those who do business with them, 
motions for summary judgment arguing that the products or services 
at issue do not qualify as infringing sales or offers to sell are more 
likely to be granted where, as in Halo, purchase orders are submitted 
and received outside the U.S.;127 the products at issue are manufac-
tured, shipped, and delivered outside the U.S.;128 and the products 
never enter the U.S.129 A finding by the court that these sales and 
offers to sell do not infringe, as in Halo, can be instrumental in  
securing a favorable settlement. 
2. SignalQuest v. Tien-Ming Chou 
In SignalQuest, Inc. v. Tien-Ming Chou, the defendants moved 
for summary judgment that their activities did not qualify as infring-
ing sales or offers to sell within the U.S.130 The plaintiff admitted 
that there had been no domestic sales of the accused products, but 
maintained that the defendants had nonetheless offered to sell the 
products within the U.S.131 The court agreed with the plaintiff and 
denied the defendants’ motion with respect to the offers to sell.132 
In this case, the plaintiff, SignalQuest, Inc. (“SignalQuest”),  
asserted three related patents on omnidirectional tilt and vibration 
sensor technology against the defendants, Tien-Ming Chou, 
OncQue Corporation, and Bravotronics Corporation (collectively, 
“Defendants”).133 The Defendants moved for summary judgment 
following reissuance of the asserted patents in October 2014,134 
 
126 KEVIN H. ZHANG, CHINA’S DOMESTIC TRANSFORMATION IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 297 
(Ligang Song et al. eds., 15th ed. 2015) (“As a factory to the world, China is also the 
world’s number one producer of manufactured goods and manufactured exports.”). 
127 Halo, 769 F.3d at 1379. 
128 Id. at 1374. 
129 Id. at 1379. 
130 SignalQuest, Inc. v. Tien-Ming Chou, No. Civ. A. 11-cv-392-JL, 2016 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 21749, at *4 (D.N.H. Feb. 23, 2016). 
131 Id. at *5. 
132 Id. at *2, *5. 
133 Id. at *3. 
134 Id. at *4. 
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arguing that they had not sold or offered to sell the accused sensor 
products in the U.S. after the patents reissued.135 SignalQuest con-
ceded that there had been no sales of the accused products in the 
U.S., but maintained that the Defendants had offered these products 
for sale in the U.S. on at least two occasions after the patents’ reis-
suance.136 Specifically, SignalQuest pointed to two quotations for 
sale of the Defendants’ accused sensor product: one quotation sent 
to a North Carolina-based company in approximately November 
2014137 and one quotation sent to a Texas-based company on or 
around March 25, 2015.138 The Defendants admitted that both quo-
tations had been sent, but argued that neither of the quotations could 
qualify as an infringing offer to sell; and, moreover, even if they did, 
neither offer could infringe because neither had been made “within 
the United States.”139 
The court disagreed.140 First, there was a material issue of fact 
about whether the quotations were “offers for sale” under Section 
271(a).141 Although neither of the quotations specified a quantity, 
each identified the accused sensor product and a price per unit for 
the product that varied based only on the purchaser’s desired vol-
ume.142 As the Federal Circuit had found, price quotations could 
qualify as offers to sell under Section 271(a) “based on the substance 
conveyed in the letters, i.e., a description of the allegedly infringing 
merchandise and the price at which it can be purchased.”143 Thus, a 
reasonable jury could interpret the November 2014 and March 2015 
quotations as offers to sell.144 
In addition, it was immaterial that the March 2015 quotation  
required customers to select one of two proposed products and could 
 
135 Id. at *5. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. at *5 n.5. 
138 Id. at *5–6. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at *7–8. 
141 Id. at *7–9. 
142 Id. at *7–8. 
143 Id. at *8 (quoting 3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech Labs., Inc., 160 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998)). 
144 Id. (quoting MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp., 420 
F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
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therefore allow the purchase of non-accused products only.145 What 
mattered was that the customer could decide to order the accused 
product based on the quotation and, as with the November 2014 quo-
tation, do so by specifying only the quantity it desired to purchase.146 
Second, there were material issues of fact about whether the 
sales contemplated by the November 2014 and March 2015 offers 
would have taken place “within the United States.”147 Here, the De-
fendants argued that neither quotation was an offer within the U.S. 
because the quotations contemplated transfer of title in Taiwan and 
the real purchaser under the November 2014 quotation might be a 
contract manufacturer in China.148 The court rejected these argu-
ments, first reasoning that the location of a sale is not limited to the 
location where legal title is transferred.149 A “f.o.b.” or “ex works” 
term in an offer for sale would therefore not conclusively establish 
that the contemplated sale would occur outside the U.S.150 Further, 
there were several issues of material fact about the location of deliv-
ery for sales contemplated by the offers.151 The March 2015 quota-
tion stated “Departure: TW Taiwan” and “Designation: US United 
States.”152 At minimum, this evidence showed that delivery of the 
accused products had been contemplated to take place from Taiwan 
and into the U.S.153 In addition, it was not clear whether the real 
purchaser of the November 2014 quotation was actually a contract 
manufacturer in China or whether the parties had contemplated  
delivery of products to North Carolina or another location within  
the U.S.154 
Taking all of these circumstances together, the court concluded 
that there were issues of material fact about whether the Defendants 
had offered to sell the accused products within the U.S.  
 
145 Id. 
146 Id. at *8–9. 
147 Id. at *9–11. 
148 Id. at *9. 
149 Id. at *10 (citing Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 769 F.3d 1371, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 
2014)). 
150 Id. 
151 Id. at *10–11. 
152 Id. at *10. 
153 Id. at *10–11. 
154 Id. at *11. 
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after the patents had reissued.155 The court therefore denied  
summary judgment.156 
Many companies use quotations at the relatively early stages of 
a sales cycle. For example, Alibaba, a Chinese multinational com-
pany specializing in e-commerce and technology, has a “Request for 
Quotation” form on its website that potential customers can fill out 
and submit online to request custom quotations from various suppli-
ers.157 However, as SignalQuest illustrates, there are potential issues 
that price quotations can bring to a company’s foreign sales defense. 
Although quotations tend to be used at the nascent stages of a sales 
transaction and may not ultimately result in the consummation of a 
sale, they may rise to the level of an infringing offer to sell within 
the U.S. under certain circumstances. 
As in SignalQuest, a price quotation may be considered an “offer 
to sell” if it identifies an allegedly infringing product and the price 
at which that product can be purchased pursuant to the quotation—
even if the customer could theoretically select and purchase other, 
non-accused products identified on the price quotation.158 After all, 
all that the customer needs to do in order to accept the offer is to 
select the quantity of the allegedly infringing product that it wishes 
to purchase.159 As a result, companies that provide price quotations 
of this nature may be less successful in moving for summary  
judgment of non-infringement. 
SignalQuest also shows that these types of price quotations may 
be considered offers to sell “within the United States” if they  
indicate that the delivery of allegedly infringing products pursuant 
to the quotation will take place in the U.S.160 In SignalQuest, the 
mere identification of the U.S. as the shipment destination on the 
March 2015 quotation was enough to raise an issue of material fact 
about whether the offer had taken place in the U.S.161 In fact, it was 
 
155 Id. at *2. 
156 Id. at *11. 
157 Request for Quotation, ALIBABA, https://rfq.alibaba.com/ [https://perma.cc/4Q9G-
E3TE]. 
158 SignalQuest, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21749, at *7–9. 
159 Id. at *7–8. 
160 Id. at *9–11. 
161 Id. 
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insufficient that the transfer of title would take place outside the U.S. 
and that the real purchaser “may” be a contract manufacturer in 
China to eliminate the material issue of fact arising out of the quo-
tation’s identification of the U.S. as the shipment destination.162  
In contrast, recall that the purchase orders in Halo were found not  
to be infringing offers to sell because the locations of the sales  
contemplated by the purchase orders were outside the U.S.163  
Under circumstances similar to those in SignalQuest, courts may be 
reluctant to grant summary judgment of non-infringement with re-
gard to the company’s price quotations. Nevertheless, it is important 
to note that any factual issues that prevent a summary judgment  
ruling of non-infringement can still be resolved in the defendant’s 
favor at trial. 
 
III. INDUCED INFRINGEMENT 
A. Legal Framework 
Parts II and III of this Article examined two forms of direct in-
fringement, namely, sales and offers to sell patented inventions 
within the U.S. This Article now turns to indirect infringement, and 
specifically, induced infringement.164 
The induced infringement provision of the U.S. Patent Act, 35 
U.S.C. § 271(b) (“Section 271(b)”), states as follows: 
“Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be lia-
ble as an infringer.”165 
To prove induced infringement, a patentee must show two 
things: first, that there has been direct infringement, and second, that 
the alleged infringer knowingly induced infringement and had spe-
cific intent to encourage another’s infringement.166 One who 
 
162 Id. at *10–11. 
163 Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 769 F.3d 1371, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
164 35 U.S.C. § 271(b). 
165 Id. 
166 MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp., 420 F.3d 1369, 
1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Chemque, Inc., 303 F.3d 1294, 
1304–05 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); see also Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. Tritech 
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induces infringement is jointly and severally liable with the direct 
infringer for all general damages arising out of the infringement.167 
To satisfy the knowledge requirement of induced infringement, 
there must be both knowledge of the existence of the patent and 
knowledge that the induced acts are infringing.168 The knowledge 
requirement can be satisfied by showing either actual knowledge or 
willful blindness.169 Willful blindness requires that alleged infringer 
subjectively believes that there is a high probability that a fact exists 
and take deliberate actions to avoid learning of that fact.170 That is, 
a defendant is willfully blind if it takes deliberate actions to avoid 
confirming a high probability of wrongdoing—to the point where it 
can almost be deemed to have actually known of the critical fact.171 
On the other hand, deliberate indifference to a known risk of in-
fringement is insufficient to establish knowledge or willful blind-
ness.172 
With regard to the intent requirement, knowledge of possible in-
fringement by others is insufficient to prove the requisite intent.173 
Rather, a patentee must prove specific intent and action to induce 
the infringement.174 Circumstantial evidence can be sufficient to 
prove intent, and as such, direct evidence is not required to prove 
this element of an induced infringement claim.175 
 
Microelectronics Int’l, Inc., 246 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Inducement only 
occurs if the party being induced directly infringes the patent.”). 
167 Crystal Semiconductor, 246 F.3d at 1361. 
168 Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 720 F.3d 1361, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (quoting 
Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 765–66 (2011)). 
169 Global-Tech, 563 U.S. at 766–68. 
170 Id. at 769. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. at 770 (“The test applied by the Federal Circuit in this case departs from the proper 
willful blindness standard in two important respects. First, it permits a finding of 
knowledge when there is merely a ‘known risk’ that the induced acts are infringing. 
Second, in demanding only ‘deliberate indifference’ to that risk, the Federal Circuit’s test 
does not require active efforts by an inducer to avoid knowing about the infringing nature 
of the activities.”). 
173 DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
174 Id. at 1305 (citation omitted). 
175 MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp., 420 F.3d 1369, 
1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Water Techs. Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.3d 660, 668 (Fed. 
Cir. 1988)). 
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B. Case Studies 
1. Largan v. Genius 
In Largan Precision Co., Ltd. v. Genius Elec. Optical Co., Ltd., 
the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the issues 
of direct, induced, and contributory infringement.176 The motions 
focused on whether the defendant’s conduct was sufficiently tied to 
the U.S. to give rise to liability for patent infringement.177 The court 
found that although the defendant’s accused products met the ele-
ments of the asserted patent claims, almost all of the accused con-
duct had taken place beyond the territorial reach of the U.S. patent 
laws.178 The court therefore granted-in-part and denied-in-part the 
motions for summary judgment, resulting in a significantly favora-
ble outcome for the defendant.179 
The plaintiff, Largan Precision Co., Ltd. (“Largan”), and de-
fendant, Genius Electronics Optical Co., Ltd. (“Genius”), a Taiwan-
ese company, supplied lenses to Apple and Motorola that were even-
tually incorporated into cellphones and tablets.180 With regard to 
Apple, Genius and Apple had entered into a Master Development 
and Supply Agreement (“MDSA”) that governed the sale of prod-
ucts from Genius to “Apple and Apple Affiliates.”181 The MDSA 
did not specify any lens prices, quantities, or models to be sold.182 
Genius’s employees negotiated prices with Apple’s employees in 
the U.S., after which Apple sometimes provided Genius with a 
Statement of Work (“SOW”).183 SOWs included information such 
as the code name of the relevant lens, a maximum price, and a min-
imum quantity of lenses to be sold.184 Genius then quoted the prices 
 
176 Largan Precision Co., Ltd. v. Genius Elec. Optical Co., Ltd., 86 F. Supp. 3d 1105, 
1107 (N.D. Cal. 2015), aff’d, 646 F. App’x 946 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The issue of contributory 
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181 Id. at 1108. 
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to camera module integrators located in Asia.185 In turn, the camera 
module integrators sent purchase orders to Genius at its headquar-
ters in Taichung, Taiwan or its manufacturing facilities in Xiamen, 
China.186 Genius then shipped the lenses from Xiamen, China to 
camera module integrators, which incorporated the lenses into cam-
eras and sold the cameras to system integrators located in Asia.187 
Finally, the system integrators incorporated the cameras into cell-
phones and tablets and sent these devices to Apple to be sold to con-
sumers in various countries, including the U.S.188 
Genius followed a similar sales process for lenses incorporated 
into Motorola products.189 Genius’s employees negotiated prices 
with Motorola’s U.S.-based employees through a three-stage pro-
cess: Genius gave Motorola a range of potentially acceptable prices, 
Motorola requested a more granular price proposal from Genius, and 
the parties negotiated a mutually agreeable price.190 Genius then 
sold its lenses to a module integrator at the agreed-upon price, after 
which the lenses moved through Motorola’s supply chain in a simi-
lar manner to Apple’s supply chain.191 This process also took place 
entirely in Asia.192 
The vast majority of the accused lenses and lens/sensor combi-
nations were sold through the supply chains described above.193 No-
tably, however, Genius supplied a small number of the accused lens 
products directly to Apple in the U.S. through FedEx or DHL.194 
These lenses were provided as free development samples at Apple’s 
request and according to Apple’s instructions.195 
Although the Apple and Motorola supply chains terminated in 
the U.S., among other countries, the court concluded that most of 
Genius’s accused lenses had not been sold or offered for sale within 
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the U.S.196 The transactions were not sales within the U.S. because 
the Apple and Motorola supply chains were analogous to the supply 
chain in Halo.197 As in Halo, Genius had manufactured its lenses in 
Asia in response to purchase orders submitted and paid for by for-
eign module integrators outside the U.S.198 In addition, although Ge-
nius had conducted high-level contract and pricing negotiations with 
Apple and Motorola in the U.S., the majority of the activities under-
lying the disputed sales transactions had taken place outside the 
U.S.199 Moreover, the MDSA governing Genius’s sales to Apple and 
the SOWs issued by Apple with maximum prices and minimum 
quantities for specific products were akin to the general business 
agreement and quarterly pricing negotiations for specific products, 
respectively, that had been deemed insufficient to qualify as sales 
within the U.S. in Halo.200 
Additionally, the transactions were not offers to sell within the 
U.S. because the sales that were the subject of any such offers took 
place outside the U.S.201 Further, the MDSA did not identify where 
the sales were to take place.202 
In sum, the court concluded that Genius could not be liable for 
direct infringement with respect to lenses sold abroad into Apple and 
Motorola’s supply chains.203 As to these lenses, the court granted 
summary judgment of no direct infringement.204 
However, the court did not agree with Genius’s non-infringe-
ment defense that the sample lenses sent directly to Apple in the U.S. 
were “de minimis.”205 While the “de minimis” exception to patent 
infringement can provide a defense where infringement has been 
“performed for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly 
philosophical inquiry,” there was no evidence that the sample lenses 
 
196 Id. at 1110. 
197 Id. at 1111–12. 
198 Id. at 1111. 
199 Id. at 1111–12. 
200 Id. at 1112. 
201 Id. at 1113. 
202 Id. 
203 Id. at 1113–14. 
204 Id. at 1114. 
205 Id. at 1116. 
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sent directly by Genius into the U.S. satisfied any of these narrow 
categories.206 Thus, the court granted summary judgment of direct 
infringement with respect to the lenses that Genius sent directly into 
the U.S.207 
The court also granted summary judgment of no induced in-
fringement for all but two of the lenses sold into Apple’s and 
Motorola’s respective supply chains.208 Largan failed to prove either 
that Genius knew that its lenses were incorporated into Apple or 
Motorola products sold in the U.S. or that Genius had been willfully 
blind about the incorporation of these lenses in products sold in the 
U.S.209 As to the actual knowledge requirement, the parties agreed 
that Genius had no insight into Apple’s and Motorola’s supply 
chains after selling its lenses to the module integrators and that Ge-
nius had no knowledge about whether its lenses were incorporated 
into products that were eventually sold in the U.S.210 In fact, as far 
as Genius was aware, Apple and Motorola’s supply chains could 
have been structured such that all of their products sold in the U.S. 
used lenses sold not by Genius, but by Largan or other lens suppli-
ers.211 As a result, even if Genius had induced Apple and Motorola 
to use its lenses, it lacked actual knowledge that the induced acts 
were infringing because the Apple and Motorola products using its 
lenses could have been sold entirely outside the U.S.212 
However, there was a material factual dispute about whether Ge-
nius had known that it was the sole supplier of two particular lens 
designs used in Apple and Motorola products during certain time 
periods and would therefore have known that products incorporating 
those lens designs and sold in the U.S. used Genius lenses.213 In an 
internal Genius email chain discussing one such lens incorporated 
into an Apple end product, one email stated that the lens was “sole 
 
206 Id. (quoting Embrex, Inc. v. Service Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 
2000)). 
207 Id. at 1116. 
208 Id. at 1120. 
209 Id. at 1119–20. 
210 Id. at 1118. 
211 Id. 
212 Id. 
213 Id. at 1118–20. 
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sourced,” indicating that Genius was the sole supplier, while another 
email sought to “find out Largan[’s] current price,” indicating that 
Largan might also be a source for the lens design at issue.214 A Ge-
nius employee had also stated in deposition that in “an earlier pro-
gram . . . we were the single source supplier,” although the transcript 
of this deposition failed to identify the Motorola product for which 
Genius was the sole supplier or whether that product even used an 
accused lens or was sold in the U.S.215 Further, Largan’s data 
showed no lens sales for a particular Apple product after the second 
quarter of 2013, which Largan argued showed that Genius was the 
sole supplier of lenses for that product; here, however, Largan had 
failed to show how Genius could have known this even if it had been 
true.216 Given the conflicting evidence, the court elected not to grant 
summary judgment one way or the other on the issue of induced 
infringement by these two particular lens designs.217 
Turning to the requirement of willful blindness, the fact that Ge-
nius had apparently never discussed whether the Apple and 
Motorola products using its accused lenses were sold in the U.S. or 
asked Apple and Motorola not to ship products using its lenses into 
the U.S. showed, at best, deliberate indifference to a known risk of 
infringement.218 This fell short of the standard for proving willful 
blindness, which requires an affirmative act to remain ignorant of 
infringing conduct rather than mere failure to take deliberate actions 
to determine whether the conduct infringes.219 Further, even if Ge-
nius had asked Apple and Motorola about these issues, nothing in-
dicated that Apple or Motorola could or would have told Genius 
how many of its lenses made their way into products sold in the 
U.S.220 In fact, Apple had stated that it did not track which lenses 
were used in its products sold in the U.S.221 Thus, Largan had failed 
 




218 Id. (citation omitted). 
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221 Id. 
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to prove willful blindness. The court granted summary judgment of 
no inducement for all but two of Genius’s accused lens products.222 
As discussed in Parts II and III above, sales transactions in which 
the products are sold, manufactured, and delivered abroad and never 
enter the U.S. are unlikely to qualify as directly infringing sales or 
offers to sell within the U.S.223 However, if those products are later 
brought into the U.S. by third parties, the original providers of the 
products may face liability for induced infringement under certain 
circumstances. Given the ubiquity of Chinese manufacturing in the 
global marketplace, this can be a concern of Chinese companies that 
manufacture and sell components to be incorporated into products 
that their customers bring into the U.S., or that manufacture products 
that are then picked up by distributors who distribute products in the 
U.S. 
As Largan showed, the defendant’s state of mind and knowledge 
of where its products ultimately end up can be the difference be-
tween liability and no liability for induced infringement. In Largan, 
Genius, a Taiwanese lenses provider, was found not to have induced 
infringement for the vast majority of its accused lenses because it 
had no knowledge about whether these lenses were incorporated 
into products that eventually made their way into the U.S.224 For all 
Genius knew, its lenses could have been used only in products that 
were sold abroad and never entered the U.S.225 In addition, the plain-
tiff failed to show any affirmative acts by Genius to stay ignorant of 
infringement that could qualify as willful blindness.226 Thus, neither 
the actual knowledge nor willful blindness requirements of induced 
infringement had been satisfied. 
This outcome on the issue of inducement, in combination with 
the court’s determination that Genius had not directly infringed by 
selling its lenses into Apple and Motorola’s respective supply 
chains,227 would likely have been a very favorable outcome for Ge-
nius. Although Genius’s accused lenses met the elements of the 
 
222 Id. 
223 See supra §§ II.B.1 (discussing Lake Cherokee), III.B.1(discussing Halo). 
224 Largan, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 1117–20. 
225 Id. at 1118. 
226 Id. at 1120. 
227 Id. at 1110–14. 
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asserted patent claims, the court had concluded that almost all of the 
accused conduct had taken place outside the territorial reach of the 
U.S. patent laws.228 Thus, Genius could not be liable for patent in-
fringement for the majority of its accused sales activities.229 
On a cautionary note, this outcome could have been different if 
the documents and deposition testimony had indicated that Genius 
was and knew that it was the sole supplier for a larger number of 
lens designs used in Apple and Motorola’s products (as opposed to 
only two such designs).230 In such a situation, Genius may have lost 
on the inducement issue at the summary judgment stage for a greater 
percentage of its accused lens products. Similarly, Genius may not 
have prevailed on the issue of induced infringement if it had visibil-
ity into Apple and Motorola’s respective sales cycles or known that 
its products eventually reached the U.S., whether as standalone com-
ponents or through incorporation in products that were eventually 
brought into the U.S.231 The circumstances of each case must be in-
dividually assessed to determine potential liability for induced in-
fringement, in light of the fact-intensive nature of this inquiry. 
2. Opticurrent v. Power Integrations 
In Opticurrent, LLC v. Power Integrations, Incorporated, the 
court granted-in-part the defendant’s motion for judgment as a mat-
ter of law to reduce the royalty base used to calculate damages for 
patent infringement to 6%—rather than one-third—of worldwide 
sales of accused chips.232 In essence, this reduced the defendant’s 
damages exposure to 6% of its previous amount. 
At trial, the jury had awarded the plaintiff, Opticurrent, LLC 
(“Opticurrent”), patent infringement damages of approximately 
$6.7 million, calculated using a royalty rate of 3% and a royalty base 
of approximately $222 million.233 The royalty base had been derived 
from the defendant, Power Integrations, Inc.’s (“PI”) sales revenue 
 
228 Id. at 1107. 
229 Id. 
230 Id. at 1118–20. 
231 Id. 
232 Opticurrent, LLC v. Power Integrations, Inc., No. 17-cv-03597-EMC, 2019 U.S. 
LEXIS 94615, at *21 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2019). 
233 Id. at *11. 
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from April 2010 through March 2018.234 During this time, PI’s 
worldwide sales of the accused chips totaled approximately $667 
million, one third ($222 million) of which were estimated to have 
eventually entered the U.S.235 
In post-trial briefing, PI argued that the royalty base was unsup-
ported by the evidence because Opticurrent’s argument that one 
third of PI’s accused chips entered the U.S. had been based on an 
inducement theory236 and the jury had found no inducement at 
trial.237 Therefore, PI argued, the one-third figure was not a reliable 
basis for the damages award and should be reduced to the 6% of PI’s 
sales that were attributable to direct infringement.238 
As an initial matter, the court noted that PI’s argument impli-
cated two fundamental principles of patent law.239 The first principle 
was that the royalty base for reasonable royalty damages cannot in-
clude activities that do not qualify as patent infringement because 
patent damages must be limited to damages that are adequate to 
compensate for infringement.240 The second principle was that the 
U.S. patent laws must be understood against a background presump-
tion against extraterritorial reach.241 
The evidence at trial showed that PI made, used, and sold the 
vast majority of its accused chips outside the U.S.242 While the ac-
cused chips were designed in California, they were manufactured in 
Asia and overwhelmingly sold in China.243 PI only sold 5-6% of its 
products in the U.S.,244 and the sales transactions for its products 






238 Id. at *11–12. 
239 Id. at *12. 
240 Id. at *12 (quoting Enplas Display Device Corp. v. Seoul Semiconductor Co., Ltd., 
909 F.3d 398, 411–12 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). 
241 Id. (quoting Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Grp. Ltd., 807 F.3d 1293, 1306 
(Fed. Cir. 2015)). 
242 Id. at *12–13. 
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In relevant part, third-party buyers of PI’s products would incor-
porate PI’s chips into power supply products and then sell those 
products to downstream customers.246 PI estimated that one third of 
its accused chips eventually made their way into the U.S. through 
these third-party products, based on a general rule of thumb that 
30% of electronic products made globally are consumed in the 
U.S.247 Importantly, PI’s Vice President of Worldwide Sales had tes-
tified that only 5-6% of PI’s sales were domestic and that it was PI’s 
customers, not PI, that imported the accused chips into the U.S.248 
Opticurrent introduced no evidence at trial to controvert the Vice 
President’s testimony that only 5-6% of PI’s revenue was domes-
tic.249 
Based on this record, the court found that the jury could reason-
ably conclude that the proper royalty base for direct infringement 
damages was 6% of PI’s worldwide sales because that was the por-
tion of revenue derived from accused chips that PI itself had made, 
used, sold, or offered to sell within the U.S.250 But, the court also 
found that there was no evidentiary basis for a jury to determine that 
the remainder of PI’s accused products that eventually reached the 
U.S. could be included in the royalty base for direct infringement 
because the undisputed testimony of PI’s Vice President established 
that those products were imported not by PI, but by its customers.251 
Thus, PI could only be liable for damages arising from the domestic 
sales of those products if the jury found that PI induced its customers 
to infringe—which the jury had found it did not.252 As such, the 
jury’s use of the royalty base of one third of PI’s worldwide sales in 





248 Id. at *13–14 (“Q: And who is it that is importing that third into the United States? A: 
That’s a good question. We’re kind of disconnected from that part of the process because 
we’re not involved in it. But I could imagine it’s companies like Dell or Samsung 
themselves would move their goods around the world and bring them into the U.S.”). 
249 Id. at *14. 
250 Id. 
251 Id. at *14–15. 
252 Id. at *15. 
253 Id. (citing Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1028 (9th Cir. 2008)). 
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Opticurrent argued that the jury had used the correct royalty 
base, analogizing the one third royalty base to the royalty base in 
Marvell of accused chips that had likewise been manufactured and 
sold abroad but were ultimately imported into the U.S.254 The court 
rejected this argument.255 Critically, Marvell was distinguishable 
because the jury found that the defendant, Marvell, had both directly 
and indirectly infringed the asserted patent claims.256 It was this 
finding of inducement, which was absent in Opticurrent’s case 
against PI, that allowed the jury to impose liability on Marvell for 
chips that were imported into the U.S. by Marvell’s customers.257 
Marvell did not stand for the proposition, as Opticurrent con-
tended, that a finding of direct infringement alone would confer lia-
bility on the infringer for every subsequent sale, use, or importation 
by its customers, irrespective of whether the infringer had 
knowledge or foresight of its customers’ actions.258 Such an inter-
pretation would have rendered moot inducement as a separate basis 
for liability where accused products eventually and indirectly en-
tered into the U.S.,259 as liability would apply no matter how remote, 
unintended, or unforeseeable the ultimate importation of the end 
product incorporating the accused product was.260 Instead, a finding 
of induced infringement requires a showing of direct infringement 
by a third party under Section 271(a).261 Thus, the assessment of in-
direct infringement damages in Marvell was predicated on, but did 
not automatically follow from, the finding that Marvell’s customers 
had directly infringed.262 
Opticurrent additionally contended that PI had waived its chal-
lenge to the “one third” royalty base by failing to object to it before 
 
254 Id. at *15–16. 
255 Id. at *16. 
256 Id. at *16–17 (citing Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Grp., Ltd., 807 F.3d 
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261 Id. at *17 (quoting Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v. Chi Mei Optoelectronics Corp., 
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and during trial.263 The court disagreed, reasoning that PI had ex-
pressly preserved its challenge in its opposition to Opticurrent’s mo-
tions in limine; raised its challenge at trial by eliciting its Vice Pres-
ident’s testimony that only 6% of PI’s revenue derived from its do-
mestic sales; and filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law, in 
which it had expressly argued that the majority of Opticurrent’s al-
leged damages were based on a theory of inducement and therefore 
at least 94% of PI’s pre-suit sales had to be excluded from the dam-
ages base.264 As such, PI had not waived its challenge to the royalty 
base.265 
In conclusion, the court agreed with PI that there was no eviden-
tiary basis to support a royalty base of $222 million, i.e., one third 
of its worldwide sales of the accused chips.266 Rather, the evidence 
could only support a royalty base of 6% of PI’s worldwide sales for 
those chips.267 Thus, the court granted PI’s motion for judgment as 
a matter of law as to the royalty base and adjusted the royalty base 
to 6%, or $40 million, of PI’s worldwide sales.268 Applying a 3% 
royalty rate, this resulted in a damages figure of approximately 
$1.20 million.269 
The extraterritoriality defense can be used to limit the royalty 
base for calculating damages to a fraction of the company’s global 
sales before, during, and after trial. If implemented successfully, this 
defense can significantly reduce damages exposure for companies 
that make most of their sales outside the U.S. 
In Opticurrent, the royalty base used by the jury in calculating 
damages for patent infringement was initially limited to one third of 
PI’s relevant worldwide sales because one third was the portion es-
timated to have entered the U.S.270 After trial, the royalty base was 
further reduced from one third to 6% of PI’s worldwide sales be-
cause the one third base rested on the plaintiff’s theory that PI had 
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induced infringement—and the jury found no inducement at trial.271 
For companies in similar situations that lack clarity as to whether 
their internationally sold products eventually enter the U.S., a simi-
lar reduction of the available damages pool can limit damages expo-
sure and encourage favorable settlement. 
It is therefore critical to preserve all objections to the use of a 
royalty base that improperly includes foreign sales activity falling 
beyond the reach of the U.S. patent laws. As Opticurrent demon-
strates, such objections may take the form of motion in limine brief-
ing; witness testimony or documentary evidence establishing the 
percentage of revenue derived from domestic sales; or post-trial mo-
tions to limit damages based on the foreign nature of the company’s 
sales.272 
3. Tessera v. Broadcom 
In Tessera, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., the court denied the plain-
tiff’s motion to compel the production of technical documents for 
products not shipped into the U.S. in the past six years, in addition 
to worldwide sales data for all accused products.273 
The plaintiff, Tessera, Inc. (“Tessera”), sought an order compel-
ling the defendant, Broadcom Corporation (“Broadcom”), to pro-
duce die specifications, Graphic Database System (“GDS”) files, 
data sheets, process flows and recipes, and other core technical doc-
uments for accused semiconductor chips that Broadcom argued 
were not shipped to recipients in the U.S.274 Tessera also sought an 
order compelling Broadcom to produce worldwide sales data for all 
of its accused semiconductor chips, including end customer infor-
mation, such as “Parent_End_Name,” “Sold_To_Parent,” and “End 
Cust Name.”275 
As to the core technical documents, Broadcom objected on 
grounds of relevance.276 Specifically, Broadcom argued that the 
 
271 Id. at *11–18. 
272 Id. at *18–19. 
273 Tessera, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. Civ. A. 16-380, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178929, 
at *1–2 (D. Del. Oct. 24, 2017). 
274 Id. at *2–3. 
275 Id. at *3. 
276 Id. at *4. 
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accused semiconductor chips were not made, used, sold, or imported 
into the U.S., and therefore did not fall within the reach of the U.S. 
patent laws and were therefore not relevant to the case.277 In re-
sponse, Tessera pointed to Godo Kaisha IP Bridge 1 v. Broadcom 
Ltd., which Broadcom had also been a defendant in.278 In Godo Kai-
sha, the defendants, including Broadcom, moved for summary judg-
ment that the accused Broadcom semiconductor chips that were or-
dered, manufactured, shipped, billed, and delivered to buyers abroad 
did not qualify as infringing sales within the U.S.279 The magistrate 
judge recommended denying the motion, reasoning that a reasona-
ble jury could find that “many substantial activities” relating to sales 
of the chip products occurred in the U.S. and thus these sales could 
qualify as U.S.-based sales under Section 271(a).280 Tessera argued 
that the magistrate judge’s analysis in Godo Kaisha was relevant 
because over 80% of the accused chips overlapped with the accused 
products in the Godo Kaisha case.281 
The court disagreed, noting that it had not been provided with 
the underlying documents that the court in the Godo Kaisha case 
had relied on to reach its conclusions.282 Tessera therefore failed to 
meet its burden of showing the relevance of technical documents for 
semiconductor chips not shipped to a U.S. recipient.283 
As for the worldwide sales data, Broadcom made a similar ob-
jection that its sales made outside the U.S. were not relevant to Tes-
sera’s U.S.-based patent infringement claims.284 Tessera argued that 
chip makers, such as Broadcom, could be liable for indirect infringe-
ment if they sold infringing products overseas that were later im-
ported into the U.S.285 For example, the accused products could be 
incorporated into third-party products that were subsequently sold 
 
277 Id. at *4–5. 
278 Id. at *8. 
279 Id. (citing Godo Kaisha IP Bridge 1 v. Broadcom Ltd., No. 2:16-CV-0134-JRG, 2017 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164103, 2017 WL 2869332, at *1 (E.D. Tex. May 18, 2017)). 
280 Id. at *8–9 (citing Godo Kaisha IP Bridge 1 v. Broadcom Ltd., No. 2:16-CV-0134-
JRG, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164103, 2017 WL 2869332, at *2 (E.D. Tex. May 18, 2017)). 
281 Id. at *10. 
282 Id. at *11. 
283 Id. 
284 Id. at *12. 
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in the U.S.286 In response, Broadcom argued that Tessera was not 
entitled to foreign sales information based on speculation that 
Broadcom sold internationally to customers who then imported the 
accused products into the U.S.287 Instead, Broadcom argued, Tessera 
should be required to test its theory through discovery.288 To this 
end, Broadcom had offered to identify its top 20 customers based on 
worldwide sales so that Tessera could seek discovery from those 
customers to determine whether any Broadcom products sold inter-
nationally ended up in products that were later imported into the 
U.S.289 Here, Broadcom directed Tessera to its third-party customers 
because Broadcom did not track where its products ended up after 
shipment to its customers abroad, and therefore could not know 
which, if any, of those products later entered the U.S.290 
The court agreed that Tessera had failed to provide more than 
mere speculation regarding its allegation of indirect infringement.291 
Although Tessera identified Broadcom customers with a large pres-
ence in the U.S. and representative downstream products incorpo-
rating Broadcom’s products, the court held that these showings were 
neither specific nor concrete.292 Rather, they required the court to 
assume that accused Broadcom products incorporated into third-
party downstream products were later sold in the U.S. because those 
third parties had a presence in the U.S.293 Thus, Tessera failed to 
identify evidence demonstrating that the Broadcom products actu-
ally entered the U.S.294 The court denied Tessera’s motion to com-
pel.295 
As discussed, a successful foreign sales defense can be utilized 
early in discovery. In Tessera, Broadcom successfully opposed Tes-
sera’s discovery motion for worldwide sales data by pointing out 
that Tessera had failed to take the threshold step of proving that the 
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data were relevant to the case.296 Tessera speculated that Broad-
com’s customers might import and sell the accused chips in the U.S., 
but provided no evidence that Broadcom’s chips sold abroad ended 
up in products that later reached the U.S.297 Broadcom’s proposal 
that Tessera seek discovery from its customers about whether the 
accused products reached the U.S. had two effects: it emphasized 
that Tessera had the burden to prove the relevance of the worldwide 
sales data, and it underscored Broadcom’s lack of knowledge about 
what happened to its accused products after they were shipped 
abroad, as required to prove liability for induced infringement.298 
This strategy can be effective in defending against induced in-
fringement claims for companies that do not track or otherwise have 
knowledge about where their products end up after the products are 
sold to customers outside the U.S. In such situations, the plaintiff 
may be forced to take the time-consuming route of conducting third 
party discovery to prove the relevance of worldwide sales data, as-
suming that the subpoenaed third parties are willing to provide the 
often confidential and sensitive information sought. Third parties 
may, for example, agree only to provide a limited subset of the in-
formation sought, move to quash a subpoena or resist a motion to 
enforce a subpoena, or simply lack the information sought. Further, 
the standard for compelling discovery from a third party is higher 
than it is for parties to a case.299 As a result, it is possible that the 
plaintiff may emerge empty-handed in its search for information ty-
ing the company’s accused conduct to the U.S. 
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299 The scope of discovery differs significantly between parties and third parties, i.e., non-
parties, because the “relevance” standard of Rule 26 does not apply to third parties. FED. 
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CONCLUSION 
Chinese companies have seen tremendous success in the U.S. 
market. They have also experienced the downside that can come 
with the territory, including increased exposure to patent litigation 
in the U.S. Nevertheless, there are effective tools for mitigating the 
risk of patent infringement liability and reducing potential damages 
exposure that can supplement the traditional defense that an accused 
product does not satisfy all of the limitations of the asserted claims. 
For companies that conduct all or a significant percentage of 
their sales-related activities outside the U.S., one such tool is the 
defense that sales and offers to sell outside the U.S. cannot infringe 
a U.S. patent. In Halo, the Federal Circuit held that the domestic 
activities of the defendant, Pulse, were insufficient to qualify as in-
fringing sales or offers to sell.300 The court’s reasoning was that pur-
chase orders were submitted and processed outside the U.S.; the ac-
cused surface mount electronic packages were manufactured, 
shipped, and delivered outside the U.S.; and the electronic packages 
never entered the U.S.301 Similarly, in Lake Cherokee, the defend-
ant, Marvell, was able to obtain a summary judgment ruling that 
77% of the sales of its allegedly infringing chips had occurred out-
side the U.S.302 As a result, those sales fell outside the purview of 
the U.S. patent laws and could not infringe the asserted U.S. pa-
tents.303 
Not all litigants will prevail on these types of summary judgment 
motions, however. As MediaTek showed, the success of a foreign 
sales defense may be determined by the provisions of a supply 
agreement or the structure of sales transactions.304 In that case, sum-
mary judgment of non-infringement was denied because all relevant 
sales were governed by the provisions of an agreement between the 
 
300 Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 769 F.3d 1371, 1374–76, 1379, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 
2014); see supra text accompanying notes 101, 103, 108–125, and 127–129. 
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302 Lake Cherokee Hard Drive Techs., L.L.C. v. Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 964 F. 
Supp. 2d 653, 654–58 (E.D. Tex. 2013); see supra text accompanying notes 22–39 and 43. 
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304 MediaTek Inc. v. Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., No. 11-cv-5341 YGR, 2014 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 18640, at *2–5, *7–12 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2014); see supra text 
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defendant, Freescale, a U.S. company, and AFS, another U.S. com-
pany, and also because it was Freescale itself that received and pro-
cessed the purchase orders for the products at issue.305 As a result, 
there were issues of material fact about whether the sales had oc-
curred in the U.S. that could not be resolved at the summary judg-
ment stage.306 Similarly, in SignalQuest, there were material issues 
of fact about whether certain quotations sent to companies in North 
Carolina and Texas qualified as offers to sell within the U.S.307 
There, the quotations at issue identified the accused sensor product 
and its price per unit based on the quantity desired.308 As a result, 
the court denied the Defendants’ summary judgment motion.309 
Companies should review their sales agreements, transactions, and 
related practices to determine the viability of a motion for summary 
judgment of non-infringement. 
In addition, companies that have no knowledge of the eventual 
disposition of their products and/or no intent to encourage infringe-
ment can raise this lack of knowledge and intent as a defense to a 
claim of induced infringement. In Largan, the defendant, Genius, 
obtained summary judgment that it had not induced infringement by 
showing that it had no knowledge regarding Apple and Motorola’s 
respective supply chains after selling its lenses to foreign module 
integrators and, moreover, no knowledge about whether its lenses 
sold abroad were used in products that later made their way to the 
U.S. market.310 Additionally, Genius never discussed whether the 
Apple and Motorola products using its lenses were sold in the U.S. 
or asked that these products not be shipped into the U.S.311 Compa-
nies in similar situations should likewise determine the viability of 




307 SignalQuest, Inc. v. Tien-Ming Chou, No. Civ. A. 11-cv-392-JL, 2016 U.S. Dist. 
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In cases where a company successfully defends against claims 
of induced infringement, it is critical to ensure that damages based 
on theories of inducement are excluded from the overall damages 
determination. This can result in a significant reduction in liability. 
In Opticurrent, the defendant, PI, prevailed in its post-trial argu-
ments that the royalty base should be reduced from one third of its 
worldwide sales to 6% of those sales.312 There, PI successful argued 
that the one third base was unsupported because it was based on the 
plaintiff’s theory that PI had induced infringement and the jury had 
reached a verdict of no induced infringement. As a result, the court 
adjusted the royalty base from $222 million to $40 million.313 
The foreign sales defense can be implemented at various stages 
in a patent case. With that said, it is a critical strategy that should be 
put into action at the earliest juncture in a case. There is no reason 
not to incorporate foreign sales considerations into an initial inves-
tigation at the beginning of a case, including by reviewing business 
practices and interviewing employees who are knowledgeable about 
the company’s sales processes. Companies should also make best 
efforts to limit discovery to their domestic activities from the begin-
ning of the discovery phase, as doing so can significantly reduce the 
heavy burden and expenses associated with discovery and, moreo-
ver, increase prospects for a favorable settlement. For example, the 
denial of a motion to compel foreign sales discovery will effectively 
deny the plaintiff the discovery it needs to prove that the defendant’s 
worldwide sales are not, in fact, outside the scope of its U.S. patent 
infringement claims. It may also force the plaintiff to take a more 
expensive and time-consuming route to prove that foreign sales dis-
covery is relevant to the case. As an example, in Tessera, the de-
fendant, Broadcom, successfully opposed a motion to compel by 
pointing out that the plaintiff had failed to identify any information 
that was specific to the accused chips or third-party makers of down-
stream products, or otherwise show that Broadcom’s chips sold 
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abroad entered the U.S.314 As McGinley showed, though, a com-
pany’s own conflicting testimony and documents can be harmful to 
its attempts to convince a court to limit discovery in this way.315 As 
such, care must be taken in constructing discovery strategy. 
Though the uptick in U.S. patent cases filed against Chinese 
companies is a recent phenomenon, the case law concerning other 
foreign litigants is instructive in forming effective strategies and 
identifying mistakes to avoid in implementing the foreign sales de-
fense. As these cases show, the extraterritoriality defense can be ef-
fective during the initial investigation, discovery, dispositive mo-
tion, and trial stages. As these cases further demonstrate, this de-
fense can be critical in significantly reducing the pool of available 
damages or, in some cases, disposing of liability and damages expo-
sure altogether. As a result, the successful deployment of the foreign 
sales defense can also encourage a more favorable settlement for the 
defendant. 
As Chinese companies transition from followers to innovators 
in the years to come, they may find themselves on the other side of 
U.S. patent litigations—that is, as patent holders and plaintiffs. Until 
then, the courts have provided guidance and a framework that will 
be critical to navigating U.S. patent cases. 
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